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COMMENTS
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE
CONFRONTATION WITH THE PROBLEMS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
The biggest need may be a change in values; the whole environmental problem stems from a dedication to infinite growth on a
finite planet. Pessimists argue that only a catastrophe can change
that attitude-too late. .

.

. [O]thers put their faith in man's ability

to reform when confronted by compelling facts.'

The fundamental national problems of environmental quality2
are increasingly attracting fervent national awareness and concern.'
The public consciousness is rapidly being awakened particularly
because dramatic and visible experiences of environmental deterioration are igniting previously only smoldering fires of discontent. The
concern is manifest for a broad range of environmental deterioration, as indicated summarily in the Report on the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969:
Examples of the rising public concern . . . may be seen in the
Santa Barbara oil well blowout; the current controversy over the
1 Fighting to Save the Earth from Man, TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 63.

2 The term "environmental quality" could, in its broadest sense, refer to the
totality of physical, social, and psychological phenomena to which the human organism is sensitive. The term, as frequently used herein, has more limited reference.
Problems of environmental quality include: air, water, thermal, and radiation pollution, noise, protection of fish, game, and other wildlife, protection of crops and
vegetation from chemical contamination, allocation of the resources of land among
the often competing demands of an industrial society for ores, oil, gas, water, power
and the demands for the recreational and scenic values of the wilderness and
countryside.
The amount of research information on problems of environmental quality is
overwhelming. For the reader who wishes to obtain a general overview of these
problems, the following survey materials may provide a point of departure: Hearings
on Environmental Quality Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); R. RIENOW & L. RIENOW, MOMENT IN THE SUN (1967); The Environment:
National Mission for the Seventies, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970; Fighting to Save the Earth
from Man, TIME, Feb. 2, 1970, at 56-63.
3 In the course of preparing this comment, it has been a rare instance indeed

when a day has passed without some news media having dealt with some aspect of
the problems of environmental quality. Indicative of the greater focus upon such
problems is the recent initiation, in one of the nation's leading weekly news magazines, of a separate news department devoted solely to the environment. Letter from
the Publisher, TIME, Aug. 1, 1969, at 9. Grass roots support for confronting problems of environmental quality has intensified, as exemplified by the National Environmental Teach-In of April, 1970. See, e.g., ECOACTICS: THE SIERRA CLUB HANDBOOK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISTS (J. Mitchell & C. Stallings ds. 1970).
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lack of an assured water supply and the impact of a super-jet airport on the Everglades National Park; the proliferation of pesticides
and other chemicals; the indiscriminate siting of stream fired powerplants and other units of heavy industry; the pollution of the Nation's rivers, bays, lakes, and estuaries; the loss of publicly owned
seashores, open spaces, and other irreplaceable natural assets to industry, commercial users, and developers; rising levels of air
pollution . ..

.4

This concern is at least partially attributable to the conscious

realization that institutions of government have as yet provided an
ineffective pattern of response, response which seems either to ignore,
underestimate, or misunderstand the scope and gravity of the
problems of environmental quality.
Policy is established by default and inaction. Environmental prob-

lems are only dealt with when they reach crisis proportions. Public
desires and aspirations are seldom consulted. Important decisions
concerning the use and the shape of man's future environment continue to be made in small but steady increments which perpetuate
rather than avoid the recognized mistakes of previous decades. 5

When decisions of national policy are made absent the participation
of the national citizenry and perpetuate the mistakes of the past,
it becomes necessary to re-examine some fundamental questions

about the manner in which our legal system now responds and might
in the future respond to this serious national problem.'
S. REe. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1969).
5 Id. at 5. "Although historically the Nation has had no considered policy for
its environment, the unprecedented pressures of population and the impact of science
and technology make a policy necessary today." Id. at 16.
6 Although it is beyond the scope of this comment to discuss environmental
quality in its worldwide context, in no sense should this comment be read to imply
that problems of environmental quality are indigenous to the United States. Europe,
for example, is plagued with problems of environmental quality. "The mighty Rhine
has become the world's biggest sewer, Venice is the sinking, stinking, decaying despair
of Europe's cultural heritage. . . . Fish are disappearing from Europe's rivers, traffic
chokes its great cities and charming old towns, pollution stifles its air." L.A.
Times, Feb. 8, 1970, § A, at 1, col. 4. Sweden has proposed and the United Nations
4

General Assembly approved a global conference on environment to be held in 1972.
N.Y. Times, June 24, 1969, at 4, col. 3.
There are many potential global environmental questions which would test the
mettle of science, world politics, and international law. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Dec. 17, 1969, at 3, col. 1. For example, what effect upon world climate would result
should the Nile be dammed to create large inland bodies of water in Africa for

purposes of irrigation, or should the polar ice be removed from Siberia to make
Siberia more habitable? Assuming adequate data, what international institutions
could make and implement decisions concerning such fundamental alterations of
the earth's ecology? These intriguing questions were suggested in an interview
with Dr. Stanley M. Greenfield, Head of the Department of Environmental Sciences,
Rand Corp., in Santa Monica, Jan. 29, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Greenfield Interview].
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One perspective in which to frame those questions and formulate possible answers is to inquire as to the specific role most
appropriately to be played by the judicial institution of the legal
system.7 This comment will develop the thesis that the role of
the judiciary in confronting problems of environmental quality
must be to assure that other decision-making bodies of government
make the best possible decisions about environmental quality.
The assurance comes only when those decisions represent a conscious and informed societal choice of public policy-a type of
choice which is, after all, a presumed foundation of the democratic
system.8 In developing this thesis, attention will first be given
to the many types of legal claims which may support judicial involvement in problems of environmental quality and will then
focus upon the specific legal claim of standing to seek judicial
review of decisions by administrative agencies of the federal government.
I.
In arriving at any conclusion about the appropriate role of the
judiciary in confronting problems of environmental quality, it
is important to survey a variety of types of legal claims by which
an environmental problem may be presented for judicial consideration. The survey that follows is only intended to be representative.
It is nevertheless hoped that it will sufficiently illustrate important
themes associated with the judicial encounter with environmental
problems.
A. Substantive Claims
It is illustrative to begin by measuring the response of the
doctrines of nuisance to a significant current problem of environ7 It is encouraging to note some initial attempts of the legal profession and
its apprenticeship to more fully assume its responsibility in confronting problems
of environmental quality. In September, 1969, the Conservation Foundation sponsored a Conference on Law and the Environment, the papers for which are planned
for book publication some time in 1970. Several law schools have now initiated an
environmental law curriculum and some law schools have formed environmental law
societies or contemplate publications dealing with legal aspects of environmental
problems.
8 It is well to keep in mind some basic definition of the ideal of this system:
"[A] democratic political system is one in which public policies are made, on a
majority basis, by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic
elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under con-

ditions of political freedom." H. MAYO, AN

INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY

70 (1960).
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mental quality, air pollution.? Sufferers from contamination of
the air have long summoned the common law doctrines of nuisance

to their aid.1" These doctrines were perhaps an appropriate tool
when the courts were confronted with a claim that some single
source of air pollution adversely affected one person or group of
persons. Such a circumstance was more common, however, when air

pollution was only the infrequent or geographically freak product
of a random industrial plant or backyard incinerator. In an era when
air pollution is a phenomenon which results primarily from the
combination in the atmosphere of contaminants from thousands
of stationary industrial sources and millions of mobile internal
combustion engines," doctrines of nuisance are inappropriate to
confront the problem. 2
Modern air pollution represents, among other things, a dominating social preference for the technology of the internal combustion

engine and the untamed smoke stack, a preference which comes at
9 Though Dean Prosser has opined that "[tihere is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance,'" W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF TuE LAW OF TORTS 592 (3d ed. 1964), the word generally represents
the law's concern to protect owners of property rights from substantial, unreasonable, non-tresspassory invasions of those rights and concomitant privileges of enjoyment. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 822 (1939). There is a distinction between a
private nuisance and a public nuisance. The former is classically a civil remedy in
the hands of a person whose rights have been disturbed. The latter is usually a
criminal offense with the remedy to be sought by the state. But cf. note 16 infra
and accompanying text. See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
592-633 (3d ed. 1964). A succinct summary of the common law requirements in
the context of air pollution may be found in Pollak, Legal Boundaries of Air Pollution Control-State and Local Legislative Purpose and Techniques, 33 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 331, 333-35 (1968).
10 Pollak, supra note 9, at 333.
11 A bibliography of congressional laws, hearings, reports, documents, and other
congressional materials on air pollution may be found in 62 LAW LIB. J. 84 (1969)
and 62 LAW Lw. J. 225 (1969).
12 In discussing possible federal regulation of air contamination and its probable
displacement of common law nuisance as an attempted solution of the problem,
Judge J. Skelly Wright has remarked: "Poor old nuisance has been the common law's
meager response to the crowdedness of society. The doctrine is pathetically inadequate to deal with the social realities of this half-century, which indisputably call for
comprehensive legislative planning." Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and
Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 317, 331 (1967).
In arguing that another common law doctrine, that of the public trust, provides a comprehensive tool for problems of natural resource allocation, see notes 33-37
infra and accompanying text, Professor Sax notes: "Public nuisance law is the only
likely doctrinal competitor. That approach, however, is encrusted with the rule that
permits lawsuits to be initiated only by the state attorney general, and not by private
citizens. It also has an unfortunate historical association with abatement of brothels,
gambling dens, and similar institutions, and the case law is therefore not easily
transferable to natural resource problems." Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471, 485, n.45
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Sax].
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the partial expense of the desire for clean air.18 Yet a change of
preference is technically feasible; the control or elimination of air
pollution is easily within the absolute technological capabilities of
our society, 14 Thus, for instance, Los Angeles or other major cities
could reduce or rid themselves of smog were the citizens of those
cities to make a basic decision to substantially substitute mass transportation for transportation by automobile, or choose to legislate
a prohibition upon automobiles without smog control devices. Such
a decision of course would require reallocation of resources to
implement a technological capability; it would require, in other
words, a partial change of life style.' 5
In California, anything either injurious to health or indecent
or offensive to the senses and which affects a considerable number
of persons is a public nuisance which may be enjoined or abated
by the court in a civil action brought by the District Attorney of
the county or city in which the nuisance exists.' Beyond question,
the purple blanket of smog which shrouds Los Angeles precisely
fits the statutory requirements. Yet no court has been inclined to
ban the automobile from the roads, The disinclination is an implicit
recognition that it is inappropriate for the judicial institution to
make a substantive determination about the use and protection
of air. That choice is properly made, if at all, in the representative
bodies of government, as the policy choice of those represented."
13 See Demaree, Cars and Cities on a Collision Course, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970,
at 124.
14 Greenfield Interview, supra note 6.
15 "Our fragmented power has outrun our methods of deciding how to use it.
Unless we invent means of dealing with technology's side effects, they will bury us."
Ways, How to Think About the Environment, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970i at 98. See
Rietze, WaStes, Water, and Wishful Thinking: The Battle of Lake Eriej 20 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 5, 65-66 (1968), Who comments in the contextt of water pollution: "If
clean water is considered an important factor determining the quality of life, then,
sufficient economic inputs must be made to achieve it. Yet, in an economy governed
by finite resources, this qualitative goal must be pursued to the detriment of some
other goal. We must make the choice."
'a CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479, 3480 (West 1954); CAL. CODE CfV. PRo. § 731
(West 1955). For a somewhat dated but nevertheless valuable discussion of the
California law of nuisance in respect to air pollution, see Steinberg, Rights Under
California Law of the Individual Injured by Air Pollution, 27 S. CAL. L. REV. 405
(1954).
17 The policy choices required of the representative body with respect to air
pollution have been more strictly resolved against air contamination in California
than in any other state. See CAL. HEALTH & SAfETY CODE § 24198 et seq. (West
1967) & CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000 et seq. (West Supp. 1970). Even
stricter emission standards and test procedures have been proposed in California.
See, e.g., Assembly Bill No. 77, 1970 Regular Soss., introduced Jan. 6, 1970. A most
severe choice is reflected in H.R. 14577, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), submitted to
the House of Representatives, which would ban the use of certain internal combuStion engines in motor vehicles after January 1, 1978. The complek solutions to air
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The assertion that the judicial forum is an inappropriate
institution for making substantive decisions about the quality of
the environment requires elaboration. The assertion derives from -a
more fundamental premise that man lives in a closed ecological
system in which the inadvertent or deliberate actions of his fellows
all contribute in some measure to the distortion, upset, or restoration
of a finely tuned ecological balance. Even though the more traditionally narrow scope of the judicial adversary process has been
stretched by such devices as the class action, 8 expanded amicus
curiae, or increasing consideration of scientific or sociological data,
the judicial forum is the least well equipped of governmental institutions to assume responsibility for decision-making which will
affect such a complex system.
Other examples of pollution serve to further indicate the complexity of factors which bear upon potential decisions about environmental quality. The current furor concerning the chemical insecticide DDT is a prominent example. Pursuing the legitimate goal of
protecting agricultural crops from insects, industry and government
have until recently ignored potentially dangerous side effects of
DDT which include the possible destruction of ocean plankton which
supplies some 70 percent of the earth's oxygen.' 9 Insecticides are
necessary, but in what quantity and circumstance and with what
precautionary testing?
pollution which these statutes provide and these bills propose are hardly adequately
or appropriately drawn by a judicial. decree abating a nuisance found by the court
to be a substantial and unreasonable interference with property rights. See note 9
supra,
It has been suggested that reliance upon the market mechanism to reduce or
eliminate air pollution is superior to reliance upon governmental regulation. The
imposition of differential prices for differing degrees of pollutant damage has, for
example, been largely responsible for the cleanliness of the heavily industrial Ruhr
River Valley in Germany. See Ruff, Price Pollution Out of Existence, Los Angeles
Times, Dec. 7, 1969, § G, at 7, col. 3. But see Wolozen, The Economics of Air Pollution: Central Problems, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 227 (1968). See also the reference to the potential cost internalizing function of the class action in note 18 infra.
18 The class action has been argued to be a possible procedural mechanism whose
successful use might stimulate the internalization of the social costs of pollution to
the parties defendant in a class action. See Comment, The Cost-Internalization Case
for Class Actions, 21 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1969). A recent class action in Los Angeles
joining as defendants multifarious automobile manufacturers and alleged industrial
polluters in a suit to abate the public nuisance of smog in Los Angeles basin was
dismissed, inter alia, for the lack of resources and competency of an equity court to
be responsible for such abatement. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., Civil
No. 947429 (L.A. Sup. Ct., dismissed Aug. 20, 1969).
19 See TimE, Nov. 21, 1969, at 59. Although DDT is being phased out of use,
the extent and speed of the phase out is as yet uncertain. See Christian Science
Monitor, Nov. 19, 1969, at 3, col. 1. The recognition of the dangers of DDT may be
but a very small step in understanding and coping with the dangers of many other
possible types of chemical pollution. See Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 1, 1969,
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Another example is suggested by considering possible responses

to increasing demands for electric power. One such demand may be
made by the electrically powered car proposed as a means to eliminate the air pollution ca'used by the internal combustion engine.
Hydroelectric generating plants have long encountered the wrath and
resistance of conservation groups who decry the scars to the countryside and injuries to anadromous fish caused by the siting of dams
and reservoirs. 2 Nuclear power plants, as alternative power sources,
may eliminate such environmental consequences, but in doing so
cause problems of radiation and heat pollution. 2' What power sources
are most desirable? Where should power plants be sited? What
measures should be adopted to prevent deleterious environmental
consequences? These questions, and many more like them, cannot
be answered in the court of law.22
The observations relating to the institutional insufficiency of
the judiciary compel harsh indictment of substantive claims brought
to the court of law which reach beyond the common law or statute
to the constitutional dimension. For instance, it has been urged that
the federal Constitution be amended to include a right to a decent
environment.2 8 There have also been those who-not unmindful
at 1, col 2. H.R. 14805, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) proposes a comprehensive study
of the effects of pesticides upon man and other life forms.
20 See note 120 infra.
21 Two researchers have warned of severe possible health hazards from radiation
of nuclear power reactors, fuel-reprocessing plants, and waste-disposal centers. Los
Angeles Times, Jan. 27, 1970, Pt. 1, at 1, col. 1. The problems of thermal (heat)
pollution of water are discussed in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, HEAT CAN HURT, BETTER WATER FOR AMERICA

(1969).
22 It is questionable, in fact, whether even present legislative mechanisms for
policy formulation are sufficient for that purpose. It has been suggested that our
complex society requires a radically new politics of ecology in which legislative institutions are responsive to ecologically based political parties rather than local interests, and in which the individual citizen is informed of the far-reaching consequences
of any one decision by individually or family tailored multi-media programming
systems. See Wheeler, The Politics of Ecology, SATURDAY, REV., Mar. 7, 1970, at 51.
23 A discussion group of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
has proposed an environment bill of rights. See Los Angeles Daily Journal, Dec. 13,
1969, at 14, col. 2. H.R.J. Res. 505, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) proposes a constitutional amendment which would include a provision that protects the people's right
to clean air, pure water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the

natural, scenic, historic, and aesthetic qualities of their environment.
Less drastic expectations of incorporating such a right, or at least state policy,
into respective state constitutions have already been partially fulfilled. An amendment
to the New York state constitution was passed in the most recent general election
by a margin of nearly five to one, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1969, at 37, col. 8. The
text of the amendment is as follows:
The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources
and scenic beauty and encourage the development and improvement of its
agricultural products. The legislature, in implementing this policy, shall

HeinOnline -- 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1076 1969-1970

1970]

COMMENTS

1077

of the difficulties of national constitutional amendment-have urged
a court to find such a right already guaranteed by the Constitution. 4
These constitutional claims, as well as an hypothesized constitutional
amendment guaranteeing a right to clean air, merit the same criticism leveled at the potential use of nuisance to solve the problems
of air pollution. Simply stated, a constitutional right requires the
court to shoulder responsibility for decision-making which is more
properly assumed by representative bodies.
B. Procedural Claims
1. Two Federal Statutes
The history of federal legislation concerning air and water
pollution manifests an appropriately increasing concern for the
serious problems of such pollution. Thus, the past decade has seen
more major federal legislation in these areas than in any previous
decade. 5 The characteristic of that legislation which is of iminclude adequate provision for the abatement of air and water pollution and
of excessive and unnecessary noise, the protection of agricultural lands,
wetlands and shorelines, and the development and regulation of water resources. The legislature shall further provide for the acquisition of lands
and waters, including improvements thereon and any interest therein, outside the forest preserve counties, and the dedication of properties so acquired or now owned, which because of their natural beauty, wilderness
character, or geological, ecological or historical significance, shall be preserved
and administered for the use and enjoyment of the people. Properties so
dedicated shall constitute the state nature and historical preserve and they
shall not be taken or otherwise disposed of except by law enacted by two
successive regular sessions of the legislature.
N.Y. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 4 (1969). In California, a similar constitutional amendment has been introduced in the Assembly. Assembly Constitutional Amendment
No. 12, 1970 Regular Sess., introduced Jan. 8, 1970.
24 One such claim is that a right to a decent environment is to be found in the
ninth amendment to the Constitution, with the assistance of Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner Waldorf
Corp., Civil No. 1694 (D. Mont., filed Nov. 13, 1968); brief for Plaintiff, Fairfax
County Fed'n of Citizen's Ass'ns v. Hunting Towers Operating Co., Civil No. 4963 A
(E.D. Va., filed Oct. 1, 1968), reprinted in Hearings on Permit for Landfill in Hunting Creek, Va., before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 50, 55 (1969).
25 The history of federal water pollution legislation is the prime example. The
problem of water pollution to which it responds is described in U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, SHOWDOwN
(1968): "For years, America has been heading for a water quality crisis . . . . Lake
after lake is sick or in danger. River after river has been turned into an open sewer
for municipal, industrial, and agricultural wastes. Beach after beach has had to be
closed to swimming and fishing."
A summary chronology of the major federal legislation is as follows: Act of Mar. 3,
1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964)) regulating,
inter alia, deposit of refuse in navigable rivers generally; Act of June 23, 1910,
ch. 359, 36 Stat. 593 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 421 (1964)), prohibiting discharge
or deposit into Lake Michigan, near Chicago, under which the Justice Department recently filed suits against offenders (L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1970, Pt.
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mediate concern here is that found in provisions for judicial remedial
action. Two federal statutes are especially revealing because they
provide for a judicial role in confronting environmental problems
in precisely those areas in which we have discussed a substantive
claim, air and water pollution.
The most recent of major federal legislation is the Air Quality
Act of 196726 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as
amended. 7 Each of these Acts vests the court with the function of
applying pollution standards promulgated by a pollution control
board:
The court shall receive in evidence in any suit . . . a transcript of
the proceedings before the Board and a copy of the Board's recommendations and shall receive such further evidence as the court
in its discretion deems proper. The court, giving due consideration
to the practicability of complying with such standards as may be
applicable and to the physical and economic feasibility of securing
abatement of any pollution proved, shall have jurisdiction to enter
such judgement, and orders enforcing such judgement,
as the public
28
interest and the equities of the case may require.

Although in each instance the court is given jurisdiction to enter
and enforce a judgment as required by the equities of the case and
1, at 1, col. 6); Oil Pollution Act, 1924, ch. 316, § 1, 43 Stat. 604 (codified at
33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (Supp. IV, 1969)) prohibiting oil discharges into coastal
waters damaging to aquatic life, harbors and docks, and recreational facilities;
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, § 1, 62 Stat. 1155, enacted in 1948
for a term of five years, extended in 1952 for three years (Act of July 17, 1952,
ch, 927, 66 Stat. 755), made permanent in 1956 (Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 518, § 1,
70 Stat. 498); enforcement of the Act was strengthened and increased support for
research and construction of treatment facilities provided in 1961 (Act of July 20,
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 1 et seq., 75 Stat. 204 et seq.), a control administration
was established and promulgation of water quality standards for all interstate and
coastal waters required in 1965 (Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89234, § 1 et seq.,
79 Stat. 903 et seq.), increased grants for research, construction, and aid to state
programs were provided in 1966 (Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 101
et seq., 80 Stat. 1246 et seq.). The entire Federal Water Pollution Control Act is
codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. IV, 1969).
The efforts are still insufficient, however. See Bylinsky, The Limited War on
Water Pollution, FORTUNE, Feb. 1970, at 103. A thorough and enlightening case study
of the pollution of Lake Erie, Rietze, supra note 15, provides an excellent vehicle
for seeing federal and state water pollution legislation and other legal response to
water pollution in action,
26 Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. For a discussion of
the Air Quality Act, see Martin & Symington, A Guide to the Air Quality Act of 1967,
33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239 (1968); O'Fallon, Deficiencies in the Air Quality Act
of 1967, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 275 (1968).
27 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. IV, 1969).
28 Act of Nov. 21, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(h), 81 Stat. 496. The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act provision differs from the quoted provision of
the Air Quality Act only in that it does not contain the italicized language, 33 U.S.C.
§ 466(h) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
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the public interest, there is one crucial respect in which the role of
the court is circumscribed: the court is to measure its judgment
about pollution by standards which have already been established
by another decision-making body. This limitation effectively commits
the choice of life style-the choice between competing values of
environmental quality-to institutions of government which more
adequately reflect, even though indirectly, the will of the national
citizenry.
This is not to say, of course, that the courts are precluded from
making any substantive choices; to weigh the equities and the
public interest is certainly such a choice. But the judiciary is never
so precluded as long as its function remains to measure action against
standards of performance, and never should be so precluded if the
judiciary is to maintain the flexibility inherently necessary to do
justice in any particular case. That flexibility, however, remains
far short of requiring the courts to assume primary responsibility
for decisions about environmental quality.
2. Procedural Due Process
The procedural constitutional mandate of due process would
seem also to provide an appropriate basis for the judicial encounter
with the problems of environmental quality. Such a claim would
demand minimal procedural safeguards2" which are characteristically
required of most governmental decision-making institutions of our
society, but which are often currently denied to those who would
represent a point of view to which a decision-maker is unreceptive
or of which the decision-maker is unaware.8 0 Those safeguardsnotice, access to information, and right of participation in the exploration of relevant issues-may typically be denied to all but those
private and special interests whose opinions the decision-making
body, usually an administrative agency, is accustomed to hearing.
Thus, for example, a state agency entrusted with responsibility for
planning forest use traditionally may entertain only the opinions
of private lumber companies while denying participation to members
of the public whose forest land the agency is administering." Since
29 The claim has been advanced in Weingand v. Hickel, No. 69-1317-EC (S.D.
Cal., filed July 10, 1969), seeking to enjoin recommendations which would approve
continued oil drilling in the Santa Barbara channel on the grounds that such procedural requirements of due process had not obtained in any procedure fostering
such recommendations.
30 It is enlightening in this context to compare the plight of the poor, who are
often similarly denied meaningful access to decision-making agencies of the federal
government. See Bonfield, Representation for the Poor in Federal Rulemaking,
67 Micn. L. REv. 511 (1969).
81 See, e.g., CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 4942 (West 1956) providing for approval
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such agencies of decision-making ultimately derive their authority
from the public and since their decisions affect the use of public
resources, responsible and representative members of the public are
entitled to no less voice in the decision-making process than are
any more acutely affected private interests.8 2
Although recognition of this right of due process would represent new constitutional doctrine, hesitancy by the courts to expand
constitutional doctrine in this respect would not theoretically seem
justified. Such hesitancy most rightfully would stem from a judicial
fear that the courts might be assuming responsibility which is
intended, in the spirit of the separation of powers, for coordinate
branches of government. But we have at least partially seen that
the appropriate judicial role with respect to problems of environmental quality is to assure better decisions by coordinate branches
while at the same time avoiding the inappropriate function of
making a substantive decision about environmental quality. The
procedural claim of due process is well suited to allow the court to
assume just such a role.
3. The Common Law Doctrine of the Public Trust
Unlike common law doctrines of nuisance, the doctrine of
the public trust may well provide the judicial institution with a
means by which it could assume an appropriate role in dealing with
problems of environmental quality. This view has been persuasively
presented by one scholar who has urged that the courts breathe new
life into the common law doctrine of the public trust,3" a doctrine
which has its roots in Roman and English notions about property
rights in rivers, seas, and seashores.3 4 The doctrine is characterized
as- demanding a judicial function which eschews the making of
of district forest practice committee rules by a two-thirds vote of the private timber
ownership in the district. Although the California Forest Practice Act declares the
management of forests to affect the public interest, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 4901
(West 1956), the extent of public participation in forest management decisions is
unclear.
82 H.R.J. Res. 505, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) proposes a national constitutional
amendment which would provide that no federal or state agency, body, or authority
would be authorized to exercise the power of condemnation, nor undertake any
public work, issue any permit, license, or concession, make any rule, execute any
management policy, or other official act which adversely affects the people's heritage
of natural resources and natural beauty, or the lands and waters now or hereafter
placed in public ownership without first giving reasonable notice to the public and
holding a public hearing thereon. Compare this procedural provision with the substantive guarantee proposed in another portion of this bill, mentioned in note 23

supra.
33

84

Sax, supra note 12.
Id. at 475.
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substantive decisions between competing values in favor of a function of providing necessary feedback to those institutions of government which are more properly the forum for decisions about the
direction of environmental quality.
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use
of the general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism
upon any governmental conduct which is calculated either to relocate
that resource to more restricted3 5uses or to subject public uses to the
self interest of private parties.

The courts are to take action after having made two fundamental
determinations: (1) that the resource decision has been made in
a situation of political imbalance, a situation that negatives "the
usual presumption that all relevant issues have been adequately
considered and resolved by routine statutory and administrative
processes"136; and (2) that a particular resource decision has pos-

sibly or probably inadequately been handled at the legislative or
administrative level.37 Upon such determinations, the court is to
send the decision back to its origin for reconsideration and, if the
decision is to be vindicated, a clearer mandate.
One implication of the possible use of this doctrine commands
particular attention. The notion of the court making a determination
that some decision needs reconsideration by coordinate institutions
of government requires a peculiar role for the attorney seeking such
reconsideration. The attorney's emphasis in litigation is more
profitably spent in convincing the court of inadequate decisionmaking elsewhere than it is in convincing the court of a decision's
inherent inadequacy. To use an example which shall be given further
consideration below, 8 if an administrative agency determines that
an area of mountain forest be developed as a ski resort, the attorney
is compelled, under the above view of the public trust doctrine, to
argue that the decision of the agency should be re-examined; an
argument that the ski resort is a rape of the wilderness is inappropriate and possibly counterproductive. 9 This attorney role is as it
should be because the role of the forum in which he argues is not
to ultimately determine the fate of a mountain wilderness, but
rather to assure that all affected citizens have a voice in the ultimate
decision.
35 Id. at 490.
36 Id. at 561.
37

Id. at 562. "Thus, the doctrine which a court adopts is not very important;

rather, the court's attitudes and outlook are critical. The 'public trust' has no life
of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more-and no less-than a name courts
give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process." Id. at 521.
38 See text accompanying notes 41-53 infra.
39 See Sax, supra note 12, at 552-53.
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II.

The examples of different types of environmental litigation
thus far examined frame a certain perspective by which the judicial
encounter with problems of environmental quality may be viewed. It
is by no means certain, however, that the types of legal claims which
have been argued to be the most appropriate vehicles for judicial
intervention will make possible any significant amount of judicial
participation in the solution of problems of environmental quality.
The possibility of a constitutional right of the public to certain
procedural safeguards in the environmental decision-making process
is a novel and little tested doctrine. The common law doctrine of the
public trust, though significantly developed recently in a few states,
relies upon precedent which is dated and which requires some
considerable judicial lawmaking; though such lawmaking may be
reasonable and justified, it is not thereby likely. Finally, judicial
remedial action per statute is of course dependent upon statutes.
Though legislatures, national and state, currently seem motivated
to confront problems of environmental quality, there is no predicting
the extent or type of environmental problems to which the legislation
will be responsive.
There is, by contrast, one avenue of access to the judiciary
which promises both appropriate and significant judicial participation in environmental problem solving. That access is provided by
the doctrinal development of standing to seek judicial review of the
action of administrative agencies of the federal government."' That
development is recent, grounded upon increasingly strong precedent
and, because federal administrative agencies have assumed broad
responsibility, is applicable to a broad range of environmental problems.
In focusing upon standing to seek judicial review of federal
administrative agency action which affects environmental quality,
none of the numerous instances of environmental litigation could
41
serve better as a pedagogical device than Sierra Club v. Hickel.
40 There Is abundant literature discussing this topic. See generally Jaffe, Standing
to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, Public Actions]; Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe, Private
Actions]; Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohieldian or
or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Comment, Administrative
Law-Expansion of "Public Interest" Standing, 45 N.C. L. REv. 998 (1967) ; Comment, The Congressional Intent to Protect Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing Barrier, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 96 (1969).
For a survey of the problems of judicial review and standing in state administrative law, see generally F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATivE LAW, Vol. II, 535-796
(1965).
41 Civil No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed June 5, 1969).
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Within this litigation are embodied seeds of controversy which are
characteristic of much potential environmental litigation. A rather
detailed exposition of the factual nature of the controversy is
necessary and, fortunately for the reader, provides a fascinating
tale.42
The controversy involves a proposal to develop approximately
15,000 acres of land in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in California,
some 230 miles northeast of Los Angeles, for use as a ski resort and
multi-recreational facility.43 The land is included within the Sequoia
National Game Refuge 44 and is more popularly referred to as
Mineral King. It is critical to the controversy that Mineral King
is surrounded by, but not included within the Sequoia National
Park,"5 and is reached by a narrow and winding two-lane road which
lies on land of the Park.46 The responsibility for planning the use
of all these lands is highly fragmented, vesting in both the Department of Agriculture and the Department of the Interior.
42 The compendium on the Mineral King controversy, to follow in the text, is
derived from the following: U.S. DEPARTMENT or AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE,
MINERAL KING, A PLANNED RECREATION DEVELOPMENT (1969) [hereinafter cited as
RECREATION DEVELOPMENT]; Hano, Protectionists vs. Recreationists-The Battle of
Mineral King, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 24 [hereinafter cited
as Hanoi; Hope, The King Beseiged, NATURAL HISTORY, Nov. 1968, at 52; Brief
for Appellee, Sierra Club v. Hickel, Civil No. 51,464 (N.D. Cal., filed June 5, 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Brief].
43 RECREATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at 1.

44 The Sequoia National Game Refuge was created by Act of Congress in 1926,

16 U.S.C. § 688 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 744, § 6,
44 Stat. 821).
45 Sequoia National Park was created by Act of Congress in 1890, 16 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1964) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 25, 1890, ch. 926, § 1, 26 Stat. 478),
but did not include land now known as Mineral King because at that time mining
claims encumbered the land. Nevertheless, Mineral King is ecologically identical to
the surrounding Park land.
46 RECREATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at 1.
47 The Sequoia National Park (including
Mineral King is under the jurisdiction of the
§§ 1, 8, 8(a) (1964). The Sequoia National
and regulations applicable to national forests,

the road on Park land) surrounding
Secretary of the Interior, 16 U.S.C.
Game Refuge is subject to all laws
16 U.S.C. § 689(a) (1964), and is

therefore under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture, 16 U.S.C. § 472 (1964).
The complexities attending an exercise of jurisdiction over these lands is noteworthy.
Since the Game Refuge is national forest land, it is subject to the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq. (1964), providing that the

Secretary of Agriculture administer forest lands for one of five purposes: outdoor
recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish. However, the Secretary of
Agriculture is precluded from using lands of the Game Refuge in any manner inconsistent with its purpose, 16 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). Thus, a use of the land for
outdoor recreation under the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act might be illegal given
the purpose of the game refuge to protect game. To complicate matters further, the
Secretary of Agriculture was originally vested with responsibility for issuing regulations which might permit the hunting, trapping, killing, or capturing of birds, game,
and wildlife, 16 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). But the functions of the Secretary of Agriculture relating to the conservation of wildlife, game, and migratory birds has sub-
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In 1949, contemplating a recreational use for the forest area,
the Forest Service (Department of Agriculture) invited private bids

for the development of the area. 8 Due, however, to the economic
impossibility, at that time, of improving access to the area, no
response was forthcoming. 9 In 1965, bids were again invited. The
bid of Walt Disney Productions was chosen in 196550 and its
master plan for development approved by the Forest Service in
1969. 51 Comparison of the approved master plan with the original

development envisaged by the Forest Service is revealing. The Forest
Service contemplated an approximately three million dollar invest-

ment consisting of three or four ski lifts, parking for twelve hundred
automobiles, and lodgings for one hundred visitors. The master
plan as approved calls for a thirty-five million dollar investment
including five-story hotels, five-acre sublevel parking, restaurants on

the peaks, shops, skating rinks,52 heated swimming pools, horse
corrals, a chapel, and a theatre.
The revelation to the public of this master plan ignited the
controversy which now rages. Competing for vindication are two
equally valid claims to the use of land, each grounded upon funda-

mental values which society seeks to preserve in its environment.
Sierra Club represents, as plaintiff, the claim to preserve Mineral
King in its virtually untouched wilderness status; defending departments and officers of the federal government represent the
claim to develop the land for multi-recreational purposes. 53
sequently been transferred to the Secretary of Interior under the Reorganization
Act of 1939, 5 U.S.C. § 133t (1964), Presidential Reorganization Plan No. II, Pt. I,
§ 4(f), 53 Stat. 1433 (1939). The net result is that the Secretary of Agriculture
has ostensible jurisdiction over the Game Refuge (Mineral King) which he cannot
administer in a manner inconsistent with its purpose, although the functions of
protecting game in that reserve vest with the Secretary of Interior. Despite this, the
Forest Service has authorized a massive ski development. No wonder that there is
controversy involving Mineral King. See text accompanying notes 95-110 infra.
See also criticism of United States land use planning, note 111 infra.
48 RECREATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at 3.
49 Id.

50 Id. at 4. Before the bid was selected, the State Highway Department voted
to add Highway 276 to the state's road system. Following a three million dollar
grant from the Office of Economic Development, the state voted approximately
twenty million dollars from the state's highway fund to cover the balance of estimated costs for the construction of a relatively straight, two and three lane highway.
Hano, supra note 42, at 50, 58, 62. It is the contemplated construction of this road
that has made the development economically feasible, a factor lacking in 1949 when
bids were first invited.
51 RECREATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 42, at 6.
52 See Hano, supra note 42, at 50, 64.
58 "The problem at Mineral King is that recreationists and protectionists look
at the same thing with different eyes. One sees public land unused and considers it
a waste. The other sees the same public land unused and considers it preserved.
One sees the tampering with nature, and considers it necessary. The other sees the
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Judicial involvement in the controversy of Mineral King has
become possible primarily because of the development of legal
doctrine within the past thirty years. The development reflects,
even if collaterally, a general desire on the part of the federal
courts and Congress that there be greater access through the courts
to challenge decisions made by the administrative institutions of
the federal government. Since the decision to develop Mineral King
is one such decision, it is important that we examine the legal
doctrine permitting such greater access.
Access to judicial review of the actions of administrative
agencies of the federal government is governed by provision of
the Administrative Procedure Act," except to the extent that such
review is precluded by statute or to the extent that agency action
is committed to agency discretion by law." That provision reflects
the conclusion that administrative bodies-then and now representing a fundamental institutional mechanism for decision-makingshould be subject to a uniform procedure of judicial review, and
hence control, by a coordinate branch of government.5 6
This process of judicial review in the federal courts may, of
course, proceed only within the limits generally imposed upon the
exercise of federal judicial power: there must be a case or controtampering with nature, and imagines a biotic community jeopardized. . . .One seeks
immediate gratification for himself; he wolfs down pleasures and seeks out more.
He is hedonist, recreationist. The other defers his gratifications, saving them for
later generations. He is puritan, protectionist." Hano, supra note 42, at 64.
54 The crucial language of the provision reads in part:
Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant
statute, shall be entitled to judicial review thereof. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
Every agency action made reviewable by statute and every final agency
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court shall .be
subject to judicial review. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964).
55 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). Although judicial review is precluded where action
is committed to agency discretion by law, § 10(e) of the Act directs that the reviewing court shall set aside agency action which is found to be, inter alia, an abuse of
discretion, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1964). Thus there is question as to whether action
committed to agency discretion by law, but which is nevertheless an abuse of discretion, is subject to judicial review. This question is the subject of a vigorous debate
between Professor Davis and Professor Berger. The latest rejoinder in that debate is
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969). Previous
literature of the debate is noted id. at 966, n.9.
56 In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), the Supreme Court
emphasized that the Administrative Procedure Act embodies a basic presumption,
entertained in cases prior to the Act, of judicial review of agency.action. Id. at 140.
That presumption is to be set aside "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing
evidence' of a contrary legislative intent." Id. at 141, citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S.
367, 379-80 (1962), and referring to legislative history of the Act to be found in
H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946) and S. REP. No. 752, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
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versy.11 The exercise of that limitation is partially the function of
the doctrine of standing, This doctrine is intended to circumscribe
the class of those persons who may invoke the judicial machinery in
such a way as to "limit the business of the federal courts to questions
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of resolution through the judicial process . . . and to
assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed
to the other branches of government. ' 18 The history of the delineation of such a class of persons is intricate and has been abundantly
reviewed elsewhere.59 It is nevertheless necessary to review some
highlights of that history which are crucial to a focus upon environmental litigation.
The doctrinal development toward an expanded class of those
who have standing to seek judicial review of federal administrative
action was given impetus by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Sanders
1
Brothers Radio Station" and Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC."

In Sanders standing was granted to a radio broadcasting licensee to
challenge issuance of a broadcast license to a potential competitor.
Standing was based upon an interpretation of language of the
Federal Communications Act which provided a right of appeal to

a "person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" by
actions of the Federal Communications Commission,6 2 language
which was subsequently to be found in the judicial review provision
of the Administrative Procedure Act.6 3
In Scripps-Howard the Court made clear that the licensees

challenging the actions of the Commission had "standing only as
representatives of the public interest."6 " As one scholar has indicated,
these decisions might be said to represent the theory that persons

of a very limited class who are in fact adversely affected by agency
action are parties who may sue without forcing an exercise of judicial
power which would breach the functions of the case or controversy
requirement."5 That such a proposition may reasonably be inferred
is confirmed by a subsequent federal court characterization of the
holding in Sanders:
57 U.S. CoNsr. art. III,
58

69

60
61
62
63
64
65

§ 2.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
See note 40 supra.
309 U.S. 470 (1940).
316 U.S. 4 (1942).
47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1964).
See note 54 supra.
316 U.S. at 14.
See Jaffe, Private Actions, supra note 40, at 1314.
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Sanders, for instance, granted standing to those economically injured
on the theory that such persons might well be the only ones sufficiently
interested to contest a Commission action. 60
Thus, presumably, potential economic injury to persons bringing

suit was a sufficient factor to assure the requisite adversariness
demanded by the case or controversy requirement. That adversariness would be assured because, even though the radio station would
be representing the public interest in broadcasting, its ultimate
motive would be to prevent its own economic injury. 7 Though
Sanders and Scripps-Howard may well be so characterized, in fact
they have initiated a line of authority which stands for a much
broader proposition: a fungible citizen,68 not just the one who may
himself be economically injured, is a party who may potentially
represent the public interest as against the actions of administrative
agencies.
We may relate this doctrinal development to environmental
litigation by examining several recent cases which mark the standards to which that proposition has progressed. In Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC 9 the issue of standing to challenge action by the Federal Communications Commission
was once again confronted. Citizen groups, as members of the class
of the listening audience of a local radio station, sought to challenge
the Commission's renewal of that station's broadcast license in the
face of the station's history of overcommercialized and slanted
broadcasting, Unlike Sanders, those seeking judicial review of the
Commission's actions did not have a vested economic grievance as
a motive for representing the public interest in broadcasting but
were rather motivated, solely as listeners, to seek to protect the
"use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain"7 ° subject
66 Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1001 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
67 But see Jaffe, Private Actions, supra note 40, at 282, and Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38, where the author points out that cases since Sanders have
demonstrated that such an economic stake in the outcome has not limited the class
of those who wish to sue and who would nevertheless be sufficiently interested to
assure the requisite adversariness, if for no other reason but that they have expended
funds in pursuing the litigation.
68 The phrase in used in Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1036. In the
influential opinion of a lower federal court following Sanders and Scripps-Howard,
the concept of the fungible citizen who may potentially bring suit in the public interest
was characterized as that of a "private attorney general." Associated Indus., Inc. v.
Icke , 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943). See also Powelton Civic Home Owners
Ass'n v. Department of Housing & Urban Dev., 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Penn. 1968).
69 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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to the free and exclusive performance of a licensee for at least three
years." The court concluded, in granting standing, that if such
listeners were denied the opportunity to challenge the Commission's
action, there might be no one else to represent the interest of the
listening audience.72 In reaching this conclusion the court implicitly
assured that such standing would still preserve the requisite adversariness required of a case or controversy: "By process of elimination those 'consumers' willing to shoulder the burdensome and costly
processes of intervention in a Commission proceeding are likely
to be the only ones 'having a sufficient interest' to challenge a
renewal application."7 "
This concept of standing acquires added potency when the
subject for decision is not the three year use of the public airwaves
affecting a local or at most regional listening audience, but is rather
a decision, such as that involving Mineral King, whose impact upon
the direction of environmental quality may be an irreversible allocation of a valuable national resource. Several relatively recent cases
demonstrate that this expanded concept of standing is crucial to a
judicial function of review which assures that administrative decisions affecting environmental quality are as fully as possible responsive to competing values.74
In Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission,m several conservation organizations and a New York
Municipality, representing a claim to preserve the scenic and recreational value of a portion of the Hudson River Valley, sought to
challenge the Federal Power Commission's issuance of a license to
construct a reservoir and pumping station at Storm King in New
York and to string the necessary power transmission lines. That
license was issued as an exercise of the Commission's authority to
70 Id. at 1003 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 1004.
72 Id. at 1005.
73 Id.

74 The system of judicial review in the United States is not the only system by
which this function may be accomplished. It has been suggested that an independent
judicial office, similar in function to the Ombudsman or Conseil d'Etat in civil law
countries, is necessary to eliminate the injustice inherently bred by administrative
bodies which apply a vast body of regulations whose generality ignores the complaint
of the individual citizen. See H. WHEELER, THE RESTORATION OF POLITICS 13, 14 (An
Occasional Paper on the Free Society published by the Center for the Study of
Democratic Institutions) (1965). See also Jaffe, Public Actions, supra note 40, at
1282-89, where it is argued that although there should be no substitute for judicial
review of an administrative action where a person alleges individual aggrievement,
there may be better ways to control administrative action affecting the public in
general than by judicial review through the public action.
75 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
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provide for the power needs of the Nation, a competing claim to the
use of the resources of the Hudson River Valley. The court granted
plaintiffs standing to seek review of the Commission's decision under
the judicial review provision of the Federal Power Commission
Act,7" a provision identical to that of the Federal Communications
Act under which standing was granted in both Sanders and Church
of Christ.
In finding congressional intent that the Federal Power Commission consider recreational purposes in developing a comprehensive
plan for the use of waterways," the court stated:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately
protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities
and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be
held to be included in the class of aggrieved parties under [the stat78
ute].

Having granted plaintiffs standing to seek judicial review, the court's
disposition of the case was to remand to the Commission for further
consideration as to the impact of the power development upon environmental quality and as to possible alternative means of providing needed power.
With the courts having reached this expanded concept of standing to seek judicial review under the person aggrieved language of
statutes creating specific administrative agencies, the last logical
step was to extend that concept of standing to the identical language
of the Administrative Procedure Act which governs judicial review
of all administrative bodies. That step was taken in Road Review
League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd,79 in which the plaintiffs sought
to set aside the choice of a route for an interstate highway which
allegedly threatened two wildlife sanctuaries and the natural beauty
of the countryside. Although that choice, made through procedures
requiring decisions of the Secretaries of Transportation and of
Commerce, was upheld by the court as representing an adequate
weighing of competing claims, the court enhanced beyond Scenic
Hudson the potential for litigation concerning the impact of administrative decisions upon the direction of environmental quality.
76
77

16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1964).
The court relied upon the provision of the Federal Power Act which provides

that the project ".

.

. will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or

developing a waterway or waterways . . . [including for] beneficial public uses,
including recreational purposes." 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
78 354 F.2d at 616 (emphasis added).
79 270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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That potential is to be found both in the court's holding that
its jurisdiction of the controversy rested upon the judicial review
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act8 ° and its holding that
the persons aggrieved language of that Act was to be interpreted to
grant standing in precisely the same circumstances that standing
was granted to invoke the judicial review provisions of statutes
creating specific administrative agencies. That potential has been
realized in the recent case of Citizens Committee for the Hudson
Valley v. Volpe81 and is being utilized in the pending case of Parker
82
v. United States.
In Citizens Committee, an unincorporated village of New York,
the Sierra Club, a citizen's committee, and other named individuals
challenged the construction of a proposed Hudson River Expressway to be laid partially upon land fill placed in the Hudson River.
The challenge was directed, inter alia, at the issuance of a permit for
that land fill by the Army Corps of Engineers in response to a
request for such permit by the state commissioner of the New York
Department of Transportation. Plaintiffs contended that issuance of
the permit exceeded the statutory authority given to the Army Corps
of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.8 This
contention, resolved in favor of plaintiffs in the district court, requires the factual finding that the project requires a causeway
within the meaning of section 9 of that Act which demands congressional consent and approval by the Secretary of Transportation
prior to the construction of a causeway over a navigable river of
the United States.84 The permit for land fill had been issued absent
that consent and approval.
80 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the plaintiffs alleged aggrievement
by agency action within the meaning of two relevant statutes. The first is the provision
in the Federal Highways Act declaring national policy with respect to the preservation
of the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964). The second
is the Department of Transportation Act provision declaring the same national
policy, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651(b) (2), 1653(f) (Supp. IV, 1969), and the provision declaring

that the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act shall be
applicable to proceedings of the Transportation Department, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(h)
(Supp. IV, 1969).

81 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The case is being appealed by the govern-

ment, appeal docketed, No. 34010, 2d Cir., Sept. 9, 1969.
82 Civil No. C-1368 (D. Colo., filed Jan. 7, 1969).
83 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1964).
84 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1964). Although approval for a causeway is seemingly re-

quired from the Secretary of the Army rather than from the Secretary of Transportation, the Department of Transportation Act transfers jurisdiction over causeways from
the Secretary of the Army to the Secretary of Transportation, 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)
(Supp. IV, 1969). The court discusses the history of the relevant legislation more
fully at 302 F. Supp. 1087.
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The district court pursued three lines of analysis of interest
here. Initially, the court found that although the portion of the
expressway which was to lie upon land fill would not itself be a causeway, a causeway would nevertheless be a necessary connecting link of
the expressway. Should the landfill be completed prior to approval of
the causeway by the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary
would be faced with a fait accompli; his decision would be severly
pressured by the fact of expense already committed to the project.
Such a piecemeal approach to planning, the court concluded, is
inconsistent with declared national policy."' Secondly, relying upon
the presumption of judicial review enunciated in Abbott Laboratories"' and upon the holding in Road Review League, the court
further held that it had jurisdiction, under the Administrative
Procedure Act, to review the actions of the Army Corps of Engineers
even absent specific judicial review provisions in the Rivers and
Harbors Act. Finally, reviewing and relying upon the holdings in
Scenic Hudson and Road Review League, the court made this broad
statement about standing:
[I] f the statutes involved in the controversy are concerned with the
protection of natural, historic, and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give standing to groups interested in these factors
and who allege8 7that these factors are not being properly considered
by the agency.

In Parker, the Sierra Club, the Eagles Nest Wilderness Committee, the Colorado Open Space Coordinating Council, a guide
who conducts wilderness trips, and other conservation organizations
and named individuals s have brought an action for declaratory
judgment and injunction with respect to a proposed sale of timber
85 302 F. Supp. at 1089-90.
86 See note 56 supra.
87 302 F. Supp. at 1092.
88 As should have become obvious by now, these lawsuits in which the "private

attorney general" is given standing to sue often inflate the number of persons who
may join as party plaintiffs. "The responsible and representative groups . . . Cannot
S.. be enumerated ...

specifically; such community organizations as civic associations,

professional societies, unions, churches, and educational institutions or associations
might well be helpful .... These groups are found in every community; they usually
concern themselves with a Wide range of community problems and tend to be representatives of broad as distinguished from narrow interests, public as distinguished
from private or commercial interests." Office of Communication of tJnited Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The fact that such a variety of
groups or individuals may join as plaintiffs may encourage a seeking of judicial review
of environmental decisions by administrative agencies in that it might allow for a
spreading of the costs of litigation. But would not this tend to undercut a rationale
for expanded standing, namely, that those who are willing to shoulder the burden of
the costly processes of intervention will preserve the requisite adversariness of a case
or controversy?
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by the defendant Secretary of Agriculture in the East Meadow
Creek Area of White River National Forest in Colorado. The action
is based upon plaintiff's contention that the proposed sale of timber,
if not enjoined, will have been executed without complying with
asserted procedural requirements of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act8" and the Wilderness Act, ° requirements which are intended to
safeguard the public interest in the preservation of the recreational
and scenic values of certain public lands. As yet, the court's only
action has been to deny defendant's motion for summary dismissal
which had claimed, inter alia, that the matter of timber sales was
not subject to judicial review and that in any event plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the proposed sales. The court found jurisdiction to review under the Administrative Procdure Act and found
plaintiffs' standing to sue controlled by Scenic Hudson and Church
of Christ.1

In reviewing these cases we note an important strategy for the
attorney whose client wishes to challenge environmental decisions of
federal administrative agencies. That strategy is to search the federal
statutes and administrative regulations which govern the agency or
agencies whose action concerns environmental quality until one is
found which possesses the two following characteristics: (1) it
refers to an administrative body which has at least partial responsibility for the proposed or rendered decision which is to be challenged; and (2) the statute or regulation contains language which
evinces concern for environmental quality. The motivation for this
strategy is identical to that which would guide an attorney basing
his claim upon the public trust doctrine: a necessity to question
not so much the propriety of an environmental decision as the
efficacy of the decision-making process. 2 Thus, in Scenic Hudson,
the plaintiffs had to look no further than the Federal Power ComAs the opinion in Church of Christ indicates, fear of inundation of agency proceedings is groundless given an exercise of agency discretion to make rules which will
limit public participation in agency proceedings while assuring adequate representation
of divergent views of those who wish to represent the public interest. Id. at 1005-06.
89 16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq. (1964). See note 47 supra. Reliance for the assertion
is presumably based upon language of 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1964): "In the administration
of the national forests due consideration shall be given to the relative values of the
various resources in particular areas." Plaintiff's complaint alleges that such consideration was not given. It is unclear what additional specific provision of the Wilderness
Act, upon which plaintiffs also rely, would require the Secretary of Agriculture to
consider the land in question as a potential wilderness area.
90 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. (1964).
91 Parker v. United States, Civil No. C-1368 (D. Colo., filed Dec. 24, 1969)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order). Subsequent to final preparation of the text, the
case has been decided on the merits. Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (1970).
92 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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mission Act; those in Road Review League found language in the
Highways Act and the Transportation Act; those in Citizens Committee found language in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899; and
those in Parker turned to the Wilderness Act and the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act.
The implementation of this strategy may well have been
simplified by the recent passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969.11 That Act provides, inter alia, that all agencies
of the federal government(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by
the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it
be implemented.9 4

Unlike the Federal Power Act or the Highways Act, the intent that
federal agencies consider factors of environmental quality is a
primary and not a collateral purpose of the Act. We have seen
that if a relevant statute, such as the Highway Act, has as a collateral purpose the consideration of environmental factors, judicial review of agency action which fails such consideration is available. The underlying rationale for that view is that the judiciary
should assure a decision-making process consistent with the statutory mandate that the quality of the environment be one factor
affecting the decision. The National Environmental Policy Act
rescues that mandate from its more relative obscurity in diverse
federal statutes and gives it a prominence of its own.
Having sketched the doctrines of judicial review of action by
administrative agencies and of expanded standing to seek such
review where the decision of the agency peculiarly influences the
direction of environmental quality, we may now return to the
litigation of Mineral King. In the tradition particularly of Road
Review League, Citizens Committee, and Parker, the plaintiff Sierra
I' Pub. L. No. 91-190, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
94 Id. § 102.
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Club seeks standing to have judicially reviewed the actions and
proposed actions of the Forest Service (Department of Agriculture) and the Park Service (Department of Interior) even though
those actions are purportedly taken pursuant to statutory authorization which has no specific provision for judicial review. 5 Thus,
the reliance of plaintiff is again upon the review provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Agency action allegedly violates
several relevant statutes and administrative regulations.
The first challenge is to the proposed issuance, by the Forest
Service, of both annual (revocable) and thirty year special use
permits to Walt Disney Productions, chosen developer of Mineral
King. The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by statute to issue
permits for specified uses of, land in the National Forests;"6 among
the several specific grants of such authority, plaintiff's concern is
with the provision authorizing permits for the thirty year use of
80 acres of land." Plaintiff's argument is that by contemporaneous
issue of a revocable annual permit 8 the Forest Service is in effect
circumventing the 80 acre limitation. The 80 acre permit will allow
construction of many major facilities of the Mineral King development, but other major facilities, including ski lift towers, refuge
and sewage disposal areas, parking areas, and roads will be constructed on land whose use is allowed through the annual permit.

It is inconceivable, argues plaintiff, that after one year the Forest
Service would revoke an annual permit necessitating the removal
of facilities integrally related to a development whose total investment would exceed thirty-five million dollars. Termination of the
thirty year permit after thirty years would, for the same reason,
also seem inconceivable." °
Plaintiffs further challenge the development of Mineral King as
inconsistent with the use of the area as a National Game Refuge, 10
claiming that the responsible agency made an inadequate study' 0'
to support a finding that the development would not therewith be

inconsistent.
Brief, supra note 42.
§ 552 (1964) (authority to grant rights-of-way for electrical
plants, poles, and lines); 16 U.S.C. § 523 (1964) (authority to grant rights-of-way
95

96 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.

for communication lines and facilities) ; 16 U.S.C. § 478 (1964) (authority to designate
up to 640 acres of national forest land for town sites); 16 U.S.C. §§ 532-38 (1964)
(authority to provide for roads and trails).
97 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1964).
98 The use of the revocable annual permit derives from the statutory authority
of 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1964). See Brief, supra note 42, at 26-28.
99 Id. at 29-30.
100 Id. at 49-50. Reliance is placed upon 16 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
101 It is not certain whether the responsible agency is the Forest Service of the
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Having challenged the actions of the Forest Service, the plaintiff further directs his attack at the Department of Interior which
is allegedly prepared to authorize construction of the access highway through National Park lands. °2 Under mandate of federal
statute, the Department of Interior is authorized to take such measures as necessary to protect the National Parks, including Sequoia
National Park. Again, plaintiff relies upon specific statutory language, here, requiring the Secretary of Interior to pass rules and
regulations governing the Parks in conformity with their purpose.' 03
In fulfilling his responsibility to protect the National Parks, the
Secretary had implemented recommendations of a Park Roads Standards Committee which had concluded that roads through National
Parks should not be used as connecting links to ultimate destinations. 104 Since the proposed road would run through the Sequoia
National Park, connecting Mineral King to a major state highway,
plaintiff argues that authorization for construction of the Mineral
King access highway would violate the implemented standards.
Plaintiff further argues that the siting of a proposed transmission
line, to run essentially along the route of the highway, requires congressional approval, not yet obtained, before it may be laid on
National Park land. 0 5 If congressional approval is sought following
the construction of the road, Congress, faced with a fait accompli,
would have little choice (a choice is obviously intended by the
statute) but to approve construction of the transmission line. Recall
that precisely this argument of fait accompli was relied upon by the
court in Citizens Committee in concluding that the Army Corps of
Engineers had exceeded its authority under the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899.100

One final challenge focuses upon the lack of public hearings
prior to the pending authorization for construction of the highway.
In January, 1969, then Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall issued
regulations which required public hearings preceding decisions regarding roadbuilding in National Parks.0 7 Those regulations were
revoked by Secretary Hickel in April, 1969.108 Plaintiff argues that
this revocation is invalid under the provision of the Administrative
Department of Agriculture or the Park Service of the Department of Interior. See
note 47 supra.
10 Brief, supra note 42, at 3.
103 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
104 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR,

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, PARK

ROAD STAN-

DARDS, 11th printed page (1968).
105 Brief, supra note 42, at 46-49, relying upon 16 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1964).
100 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
107 34 Fed. Reg. 1405 (1969).
108 34 Fed. Reg. 6985 (1969).
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Procedure Act which requires certain procedures be followed in
the promulgation of rules. 09 Plaintiff contends that since such procedures were not followed, the hearings required under the illegally
revoked regulations must be held." 0
It is thus through a series of claims, each based upon the
language of relevant legislation or administrative regulation, that
the Sierra Club seeks to enjoin agency action which would clear
the path to the Mineral King development. The action is, as we
have seen, one of many in a line of environmental lawsuits which
have as their prime focus the resolution of deeply troubling questions about the use and the quality of our environment. They are
questions whose solution would hopefully transcend the fragmented
and bureaucratic governmental response which typifies federal administrative agency action and could be safely said to characterize
similar decision-making bodies at other levels of government;"'
they are questions whose solution demands a philosophy of planning
which views environmental resources as valuable assets rather than
unlimited commodities and requires an effective and meaningful
decision-making process to implement that philosophy.
III.
The phenomenon of environmental litigation is clearly indicative of a fundamental demand of the citizen for a more effective
voice in the decisions which affect the quality of his life. The different legal institutions of our society assume varying responsibilities for responding to that demand. The preceding analysis has
been directed toward the goal of demonstrating the fundamental
109 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the revocation of a rule is considered
"rule making", 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1964). The procedural requirements for rule
making include notice of time, place, and manner, 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1964).
110 Brief, supra note 42, at 44-46.
111 Resource policy in the United States has long been governed by an exploitation ethic and "a trust that everything will come out all right, that particular
resources are limitless, that predictions and warnings of possible catastrophe are
merely the voices of Cassandras who fail to appreciate the true genius of America

and the destiny of the American people." N.

WENCERT, NATURAL

RESOURCES AND THE

STRUGGLE 17 (1955). See generally id. at 15-30. For an excellent discussion
of the deficiencies of land use planning in the United States and of possible solutions,
see generally REICH, BUREAUCRACY AND THE FORESTS (An Occasional Paper on the
Role of the Political Process in the Free Society published by the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions) (1962). A comprehensive discussion of the history,
philosophy, procedure, and future of federal land management may be found in
POLITICAL

M. CLAWSON & B. HELD, THE FEDERAL LANDS: THEIR USE AND MANAGEMENT (1957).

A discussion of the foreign experience in resource management and its lessons for
the United States appears in COMPARISONS iN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (H. Jarrett
ed. 1961).
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proposition that the appropriate role to be played by the judicial
institution in response to that demand is to ventilate the decisionmaking processes of coordinate decision-making institutions. 12
Precisely at the point where responsibility for environmental decision-making is not adequately being assumed, or fulfilled by other
institutions of government, the courts can and must play their most
vital role.
There is, of course, no novelty in this type of judicial role, for
the courts have previously revealed the imperfections of the decisionmaking processes of our society and, in one form or another, attempted to correct the imperfections. The most prominent example
of judicial resuscitation of coordinate decision-making institutions
is the Reapportionment Cases." 3 The fundamental impact of those
cases has been to assure that institutions of government in a democratic society which are vested with responsibility for making decisions between competing values and demands of large groups of
people be truly representative of those values and demands.
Judicial review of environmental decisions of the administrative agencies of the federal government is a significant method for
surfacing and partially mending the imperfect response of our society to the problems of environmental quality. Although such
agencies by no means make all decisions affecting environmental
quality, the amount of such agency decisions is substantial. Moreover, the basic themes of judicial participation in decisions by those
112 This thesis has recently been alternatively articulated in Sax, supra note
12, at 558-59. "Understandably, courts are reluctant to intervene in the processes
of any given agency. Accordingly, they are inclined to achieve democratization
through indirect means-either by requiring the intervention of other agencies which
will serve to represent underrepresented interests or by calling upon the legislature
to make an express and open policy decision on the matter in question. The phenomenon of indirect intervention reveals a great deal about the role of the judiciary. The
closer a court can come to thrusting decision making upon a truly representative
body-such as by requiring a legislature to determine an issue openly and explicitlythe less a court will involve itself in the merits of the controversy." (emphasis added).
As another less direct means of affecting decisional responsibility, it has been
suggested that the courts should shift the burden of proof in a lawsuit to the party
whose action threatens environmental quality. Such party could for instance be
required to show a greater necessity for the action and the unavailability of less
onerous alternatives. Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Preo:
Some Comments and Suggestions, unpublished paper presented to the Conference on
Law and the Environment, Sept. 11-12, 1969 (on file U.C.L.A. Law Review; soon to
be published in book form with other papers presented to the Conference). See
Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 223 A.2d
130 (1966) for an example of such shifting of the burden of proof.
118 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). See generally Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society
-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CoRN=~ru L. Rav. 1 (1968).
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agencies extend to environmental decisions made by similar agencies at state and local levels.
It is crucial to explicitly relate the expanded doctrine of standing to the judicial function of assuring more representative decisionmaking. The Mineral King controversy is well suited as a point of
reference. Sierra Club v. Hickel is the result of the Sierra Club's implicit assertion that the decision about Mineral King ignores what
established standards there are for allocating a limited natural resource. It is a case which testifies to the phenomenon which finds
multifarious administrative agencies, each given fragmented responsibility for a decision about environmental quality, rendering decisions which represent an incomplete weighing of competing values.
The phenomenon is not uncommon. The Forest Service and the Park
Service are but two of many bureaucracies which tend to develop
.skewed views of the public interest. "Bureaucratic specialization
leads to parochialism, excessive preoccupation of the agency with
its own goals and its own vision of the public interest, and a disproportionate sacrifice of other social and economic interests to
those it feels itself commissioned to protect and foster.""' 4 The controversy concerning proposed construction of an access highway
to the Mineral King development is a case in point. The Forest
Service, concerned solely with insuring the economic feasibility
of a recreational development, seems to ignore the prohibition by
the Park Service of road connecting links built through National
Parks, a prohibition which itself partially results from tunnel vision.
The parochialism of administrative agencies is perpetuated by
the isolation of the members of such agencies, mostly appointive,
from ultimate responsibility to the voter and hence to an entire
range of divergent viewpoints. There may well be partial justification for this isolation insofar as certain types of highly technical
i14 Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Government Planning: Judicial Review and
Policy Formation, 35 GEO. WASH. L. Ray. 329, 343 (1966). In describing the Army
Corps of Engineers as one of many federal bureaucracies and programs which work
at cross purposes, one journalist has noted: "The Department of Agriculture drains
wetlands while the Department of Interior tries to preserve them. The Corps dams
wild rivers while the Department of Interior tries to save them. The Corps and the
Bureau of Reclamation in Interior provide farmlands for crops which farmers are
paid not to produce. The government spent $77 million to build the Glen Elder Dam
in Kansas, a Bureau of Reclamation project which provided land to produce feed
grains, for which the government pays out hundreds of millions of dollars a year
to retire." Drew, Dam Outrage: The Story of the Army Engineers, ATLANTIC, April,
1970, at 52. In recently issuing a permit for exploratory drilling on two oil leases in
the Santa Barbara Channel, a spokesman for the issuing authority, the Army Corps
of Engineers, remarked that his organization can only consider navigation and national
defense in authorizing permits On the outer continental shelf. L.A. Times, Mar. 28,
1970, Pt. 1, at 1, col. 1.
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decision-making, especially those demanding long range planning,
require decision-makers whose "job security" will assure a measure
of continuity and the training and experience necessary to aid
mature judgment.'1 But the isolation requires an effective counterweight. That counterweight is provided by an expanded class of
those who have standing to seek judicial review of the decisions of
such agencies. Such expanded access to judicial review enables the
individual citizen to cast a different kind of vote, one which does
not elect or depose an individual decision-maker, but one which
informs the court that some voters believe that a particular point of
view is being ignored or underestimated by the decision-making

body.

116

The potential response of a court to such a "vote" is varied.
The vote may be deemed as already counted and an agency decision
affirmed, as in Road Review League," 7 or uncounted and a decision
remanded for agency reconsideration, as in Scenic Hudson."8 Alternatively, the vote may reveal to the court an excess of statutory
authority which would have gone unnoticed absent a lawsuit, such
that an agency will then be prohibited from implementing its
decision. Thus, for example, if Sierra Club prevails on its claim that
land use permits may not be legally issued for the recreational
development as presently planned, a smaller development (perhaps
without chapel, horse stables, theatre, or swimming pools) might
be replanned, or a new site located, or the project abandoned.
The dynamics of institutional interaction will often, however,
be more intricate and complex. Lawsuits, either individually or in
the aggregate, may well stimulate specific or comprehensive legislative action. For example, in direct response to the Mineral King
litigation a bill has been introduced into Congress which proposes
to incorporate the Sequoia National Game Refuge into the Sequoia
National Park."' If passed, the bill would reflect an open and
115 C.

BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 180 (1960).

116 "In criticizing administrative law, we should not overlook the fact that one
of the underlying functions of legal proceedings against the government is not to
4win' in the old fashioned sense of winning a lawsuit, but to force the government to
pay attention to a particular point of view." Reich, The Law of the Planned Society,
75 YALE L.J. 1227, 1260-61 (1966).

117 See text accompanying note 77 supra.
118 See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
119 H.R. 13521, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The former head of the New York
based Environmental Defense fund, established for the purpose of initiating environmental litigation, has remarked: "Every piece of enlightened social legislation that has
come down in the past 50 or 60 years has been preceded by a history of litigation. It
is the highest use of the courtroom-even when we lose-to focus public attention
and disseminate information about intolerable conditions." TinM, Oct. 24, 1969, at
54. Even though extreme, the statement is food for thought. See note 120 infra.
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visible decision about the quality of the environment, namely, that
Mineral King should not be developed as a ski resort. Beyond such
a bill, Congress might hopefully be induced to redraft the entire
body of legislation which currently vests decision about the use of
these public lands in diverse agencies and provides standards for
decision-making which are ill suited to today's planning needs. 120
The fundamental impact of judicial confrontation with problems of environmental quality may not be truly understood for
many years. Well understood, however, is that the response of
institutions of government to the problems of environmental quality,
in an era of rising disenchantment with those institutions and with
those who criticize them, is a signal test of the viability of this
society's mechanism for decision-making. The judiciary has a vital
responsibility to fulfill in passing that test if we are to maintain
optimism that our democratic system of government can adequately
respond to the diverse demands for a better quality of life.
GARY NEUSTADTER
120 A revealing example of institutional dynamics may be seen in the response
to suits such as Scenic Hudson which have impeded power development in the name
of protecting the scenic and recreational values of the countryside. Due primarily
to stiff opposition from conservationists through lawsuits, 23 of 65 nuclear power
plants and 23 of 125 conventional plants planned for 1967 are behind schedule, including 60% of all new plants and transmission lines in New England. These delays
have led private power companies both to expend funds for protection of environmental quality threatened by poor land use, radiation or thermal pollution, and to
call for federal, state, and local laws which would set specific criteria for environmental considerations which, if met, would clear a power plant for construction. See
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 12, 1969, at 17, col. 1. See H.R. 7052, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) which proposes just such a solution. On the problems of balancing this
Nation's need for power with its need for recreational and scenic resources, see
generally Poland, Development of Recreational and Related Resources at Hydroelectric
ProjectsLicensed by the Federal Power Commission, 4 LAND AND WATER L. REv. 375
(1969); Tarlock, Preservation of Scenic Rivers, 55 Ky. L.J. 745, 783-97 (1967).
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